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GEORGE FLETCHER AND COLLECTIVE GUILT: A
CRITICAL COMMENTARY ON THE 2001
STORRS LECTURES

Herbert Mors*
INTRODUCTION

Professor George Fletcher's writings over the many years of his.
exceptionally productive scholarly life have, to a remarkable degree,
been marked by great daring and originality. They have significantly
enriched our understanding of issues within the areas of criminal law,
torts, comparative law, constitutional law, victims' rights, and loyalty,
to name but a few.1 Now, in the Storrs Lectures, delivered at the Yale
Law School in November 2001 and published as The Storrs Lectures:
Liberals and Romantics at War: The Problem of Collective Guilt,2 he focuses
attention on the topic of guilt, primarily collective guilt. As we might
have predicted given his other scholarly work, on display are his customary boldness, breadth of vision and concern for solidly mooring
the abstract in the concrete. He also presents a novel and provocative
thesis which, if adopted, might have considerable practical importance in a range of legal cases of great significance, including the
ongoing prosecution of Slobodan Milogevie. 3
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Additionally, in these Storrs Lectures Fletcher draws upon a variety
of sources-domestic criminal law, international law, philosophy, religious texts (the Bible), and literary works (Sophocles, Dostoyevsky,
Philip Roth are discussed)-to provide illuminating examples and to
move the argument forward. There is extensive consideration of Karl
Jaspers's The Question of German Guilt,4 a classic and important contribution. to the topic of collective guilt published shortly after World
War II. The Storrs Lectures are among Professor Fletcher's most richly
textured and fascinating works. They also differ dramatically from
what audiences of legal scholarship generally have placed before them
for consideration, for their focus is on a topic calculated to engage the
reader's emotions, and what Fletcher has to say is likely to stimulate a
potentially distressing kind of self-reflection. Lectures with themes
naturally leading to consideration of the concepts and phenomena of
original sin, anti-Semitism, slavery within the United States, and the
Holocaust make a claim on both our minds and on our moral
sensibilities.
Professor Fletcher offers arguments, often in a tentative manner,
for a number of claims, of which the following appear to be the most
important. There is, first, his claim that "Romanticism" involves a
mode of thinking more congenial to the idea of collective guilt than
"Liberalism," a perspective that he views as focusing exclusively on the
guilt of individuals. 5 These contrasting perspectives are the "war" referred to in the title of his Lectures. Second, Fletcher believes that
guilt is appropriately attributable to nations, and, in particular, he argues for the guilt of the German nation during the Third Reich, contrasting his view with that of Karl Jaspers. 6 Third, he is sensitive to
certain risks that arise once one thinks in terms of collective guilt-a
risk of particular concern to him is that of anti-Semitism-and he proposes a formula for avoiding such risks while still remaining committed to the idea of collective guilt. 7 Finally, he believes that the idea of
collective guilt-and this is the principal use to which he puts the concept-can serve to "humanize" our practice of punishment by using it
in a way not currently recognized, as a ground for mitigation of punishment. 8 For example, evidence of the guilt of the German nation,
in Professor Fletcher's judgment, ought to have been admitted in the
4
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trial of Adolf Eichmann as relevant to the issue of possible mitigation
of his sentence. 9
In this review Essay I consider two major topics related to these
claims, though only the second in detail. The first is the topic of "the
war" between Romanticism and Liberalism and what relevance
Fletcher views it having for the topic of collective guilt. The second is
the relationship between the guilt that might attach to a group or
collective-his principal example is the nation-and the guilt of a
member of the collective, for example, a German national. This
topic, in turn, involves two significantly different inquiries. What inference is permissible from the guilt that attaches to a collective (a
government, political party, nation, club, etc.) to the guilt of individual members of the collective who appear for any number of reasons
to be innocent of moral wrongdoing? And, second, are there circumstances in which the guilt attributable to the collective might serve to
mitigate to some degree the guilt of an individual member of the collective who has in fact done wrong? It is this second inquiry to which I
shall principally devote attention in this commentary.

I.

LIBERALS AND RoMANTICS AT WAR

Professor Fletcher draws a distinction between what he labels a
"Romantic" and a "Liberal" perspective on reality, and this distinction
is intended to further our understanding of collective guilt. 10 A commitment to the Romantic perspective disposes one to think in terms
of groups, of nations, of wholes; it is the disposition to view society as
an organic whole. It is "expansionist" in its outlook and eschews an
analysis of wholes or of complex units by reducing them to their component parts." I It approaches phenomena in what we might regard as
a holistic manner. Professor Fletcher also elaborates upon another
feature of the Romantic orientation. It is a feature that might strike
one as dramatically at odds with the expansionist outlook, for it glorifies the inner self and values most highly, in Isaiah Berlin's words,
"[p]urity of heart, integrity, devotion, dedication."' 2 The relationship
of this feature of Romanticism to the idea of collective guilt is an issue
to which I give attention later when I turn to the role of collective
13
guilt as a mitigating factor.
9
10
11
12
13

Id. at 1539-41.
Id. at 1507.
Id. at 1508.
Id. at 1550 (quoting ISAIAH BERLIN, THE ROOTS OF ROMANTICISM 10 (1999)).
See discussion infra Part III.B.
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Liberalism is characterized in a markedly different way. Its perspective is best represented in important features of our criminal law,
where we encounter "the principles of voluntary choice, methodological individualism, and individual responsibility."' 4 Liberalism is also
associated with what Professor Fletcher regards as a "reductionist" approach. 15 The liberal, to take but one of several examples offered to
illustrate the contrast between an expansionist and a reductionist perspective, "replaces the expansionist self with the causal language of
incentives and drives. If Theodore Parker saw the Civil War as the
acting out of great ideas on the stage of history, Richard Posner would
presumably prefer to think about the respective economic advantages
6
of abolition and slavery."1
With this characterization of the different perspectives in mind
we can, without difficulty I think, see that the difference in perspectives might affect one's attitudes toward attributing guilt to a collective. Professor Fletcher writes, "My claim is only that a strong
methodological and cultural affinity binds Romantic thought to imputations of collective guilt on the one hand, and liberal thought to the
insistence that only individuals can be guilty on the other."1 7 Fletcher
is drawn to the Romantic perspective largely because of its inclination
to attribute guilt to entities such as nations.18 His Storrs Lectures are an
attempt to derive some truths from this perspective while also seeking
to avoid what he regards as its possible "distortions" or "perversions."' 9
In making out a case for the Romantic perspective, Professor
Fletcher believes that he must navigate between a Romantic tendency
that might lead, on one hand, to transmitting guilt by birth, giving rise
to too much guilt, and an evil such as anti-Semitism. On the other
hand, one cannot defeat guilt entirely through the idolization of
sincerity, what Professor Fletcher labels "guiltless sincerity," 20 where
the sincerity of belief in doing right serves to defeat guilt. While he
believes that guilt can attach to entities such as nations, he declines to
draw the inference that each and every national is guilty, for this
would be too flagrantly to flout his liberal convictions. I later discuss
21
his ultimate resolution of the problem of guiltless sincerity.
14
15
16

Fletcher, supra note 2, at 1502.
Id. at 1508.
Id. at 1508-09.

17

Id. at 1507.

18

See id. at 1507-09.

19 Id. at 1512.
20 Id. at 1550.
21

See infra Part III.B.

2003]

GEORGE FLETCHER

AND

COLLECTIVE GUILT

735

Professor Fletcher acknowledges that long before anything appropriately thought of as Romanticism existed, many cultures-early
Hebraic culture as represented in the Bible, for example-attributed
22
responsibility and guilt to collectives and not just to individuals.
With regard to such attributions of guilt to a collective there are at
least two importantly different issues raised. The first is whether or
not it is meaningful to attribute guilt to a collective, guilt, that is, of
what Professor Fletcher labels an "associative," rather than "aggregative," nature. 23 Aggregative guilt would simply total the guilt of individual members of the collective, while associative guilt attaches to the
collective in its character as a group. In other words, associative guilt
is not simply the sum of the individual members' guilt. The Romantic
perspective, as we have seen, is quite sympathetic to attribution of associative guilt.
A second issue, certainly raised by biblical texts, is the permissibility (from a moral and logical point of view) of drawing an inference
from the guilt of an individual member of the collective to the guilt of
the collective. There is nothing in Professor Fletcher's characterization of Romanticism that would appear to countenance the legitimacy
of such an inference without more being established-the more being, for example, the individual wrongdoer acting in his or her capacity as a representative of the collective in doing wrong.
But if we now turn our gaze upon Liberalism with its emphasis on
individual responsibility, do we find a significant difference from the
approach taken by those with a Romantic persuasion? I think not, for
when an issue of corporate criminal liability arises, those of a liberal
persuasion do not find it conceptually troubling. One need not be in
the grip of a Romantic impulse, of an "expansionist" as opposed to a
"reductive" perspective, to apply meaningfully a variety of predicates
to collective entities such as the actions of law school faculties or one's
government. For it seems evident that law professors of liberal persuasion, for example, often think that the law faculty of which they are a
member has acted stupidly or wrongly in an associative sense. Attributions of guilt do not appear to offer any particular obstacles either, for
when a department or a government has done wrong, liberals, by virtue of their attachment to individual responsibility, do not appear precluded from finding reasonable-indeed obligatory-apologies,
reparations, and other actions in accordance with ajudgment of guilt.
Further, when the issue is whether one is entitled to infer the
guilt of a collective from the wrongdoing of a member, it is not evi22
23

Fletcher, supra note 2, at 1560-62.
Id. at 1509.
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dent that those of a Romantic and those of a Liberal persuasion need
reach different conclusions. Both would seem to believe it essential to
establish more than mere membership in a collective before one was
entitled to draw an inference to the guilt of the collective, typically,
for example, acting in one's capacity as a representative of the collective. If there is merit in these observations, it is unclear to me just how
much of a contribution the Romantic-Liberal distinction makes to the
issues raised by collective guilt. It might be thought to be significant
when an issue arises concerning an entity of the kind that might have
guilt appropriately attributed to it, say, a nation. But if one has doubts
about the appropriateness of attributing guilt to a nation, it need not
result from a disinclination to apply guilt to a collective, but instead
from oddities associated with the concept of a nation. For example, it
could result from one's doubts about just what constitutes a nationhow it resembles and differs from "the government," "the people,"
and "the culture," how, if cultural traditions and ideals are essential to
the idea of a nation, guilt is an appropriate concept to apply to such
matters-and not doubts about the idea of collective guilt.
II.

COLLECTIVE GUILT AND THE GUILT OF INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF
THE COLLECTIVE

The issue concerning the relationship of collective guilt to the
guilt of individual members of the collective can arise in two fundamentally different ways. The first I have just discussed: what inferences, under what circumstances, are permissible from the guilt of an
individual member of a collective to the guilt of the collective. The
second issue arises once the guilt of the collective is acknowledged:
what inferences are permissible from that guilt to the guilt of individual members of the collective? On this issue, too, the distinction between Romanticism and Liberalism does not prove, I believe,
particularly helpful.
Professor Fletcher, throughout his essay, is troubled by what he
believes might be a consequence-a possible "distortion" or "perversion" of Romanticism-of giving into the Romantic way of looking at
the world, namely drawing an inference from the guilt of a collective
to the guilt of individuals of the collective merely by virtue of their
membership in the collective. In that way lies the vice of anti-Semitism. For example, he writes,
To ascribe irreducible, associative national guilt to the Germans is
to repeat the intellectual indecency of anti-Semitism. Implicit in
[that] charge, however, is an assumption that national guilt is necessarily passed by birth to the next generation. Might it not be possi-
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ble, however, to think of all compatriots living in Germany at the
time of the Nazis as collectively guilty, but of Germans born after
24
the war as free from the taint?
He concludes his essay by writing, "In the end I find a claim of associative, nontransitive guilt . . . over time leaves open the question
'25
whether particular individuals are to be stigmatized.
First, let us grant that a collective entity appropriately has guilt
attributed to it, or for that matter, stupidity or carelessness or innumerable other predicates. It seems evident that from the appropriateness of applying the predicate to the collective, the inference that the
predicate applies to each and every member of the collective is not
permissible. If we suppose that some Jews in the time of Jesus could
fairly be said to speak in the name of the Jewish people, that in some
manner they were authorized to do so, and if we suppose further that
these Jews were guilty of having done serious wrong to Jesus in the
name of the Jewish people as a whole, it might be appropriate to attribute collective guilt to the Jewish people. If we accepted this reasoning, what would follow about the guilt of any particular Jew living at
the time of the wrong or living subsequently? Surely nothing.
The vice of anti-Semitism, then, might have, among its numerous
sources, two different forms of inappropriate inference. The first
would be to assume from the fact, and that fact alone, that someone
who was Jewish committed a wrong that the Jewish people as a whole
were guilty. And the second inappropriate inference would be occasioned if the Jewish people were as a whole appropriately thought
guilty, it was thought to follow that each and every Jewish person was
individually guilty.
I am confident that Professor Fletcher would agree with these
points. What is unclear to me is the emphasis he places, in his framing the issue and in the conclusion he reaches, on transmission of
guilt across generations. The factor that makes impermissible the inference from collective guilt to individual guilt does not turn on
whether one was alive at the time of the wrong. We need only consider the example of Germany during Hitler's time in power. Professor Fletcher believes that the German nation can appropriately be
regarded as guilty in his associative sense. 26 But numerous Germans
living during the period of the Third Reich and the commission of
horrible crimes cannot be said to be guilty of these wrongs as individuals. There were Germans who were innocent infants at the time,
24

Id. at 1533.

25 Id. at 1572.
26

Id. at 1539-41.

NOTRE

DAME

LAW

REVIEW

[VOL- 78:3

Germans who risked their lives in opposing the wrongs and, to take an
extreme case, there were Jews who were being persecuted, tortured,
and killed who were also German nationals.
It seems to me that what does transfer across generations, the
"taint" as Professor Fletcher refers to it,27 is the collective guilt if and
when it is appropriately attributable to the collective. That guilt does
not require that any member of the collective at the time of the wrong
giving rise to the guilt is still alive. Such collective guilt explains and
justifies the United States offering an apology to'those of Japanese
ancestry whose liberty was unjustifiably infringed, and it would seem
also tojustify providing reparations to them. Itjustifies the reparative
actions taken by the German nation subsequent to the period in
which the wrongs were committed. Similarly, it would clearly make
plausible the suggestion, whatever the difficulties in implementing it,
that the United States owes reparations as a consequence of the guilt
arising from the institution of slavery.
While inferences drawn to the guilt of any particular individual of
the collective from the guilt of the collective seem evidently fallacious,
it is an entirely different matter, of course, when one focuses on particular individuals and the variety of ways in which they might individually be guilty for the evils perpetrated, for example, by being
complicitous in wrongdoing or by failing to protest when possible
without serious risk or failing, when no risk was involved, to offer assistance or a word of comfort to the victims of Nazi brutality or, even, as
a consequence of being gratified by what was taking place or in some
manner, often subtle and difficult to detect, of benefiting from the
evil being perpetrated. Several of these sources of guilt clearly do not
require one's having been alive at the time of the initial wrong-economically benefiting from the wrongs committed before one's birth,
for example. When collective guilt attaches to the actions of one's
government or to a nation, and where the guilt relates to a monumental wrong such as slavery or any other crimes against large groups of
people, it is not difficult to imagine that substantial numbers of individuals are in some manner guilty, and not simply those who were
alive at the time of the wrongs.
If we turn our attention from being guilty to feeling guilty, we can
also, I think, understand that someone not implicated in any manner
in wrongdoing-someone an infant at the time, someone risking their
life to protest, someone born subsequent to the events-might feel
guilty, a feeling not grounded in acknowledgement of some fault, but
entirely through identification with the collective that bears the guilt.
27

Id. at 1546-49.
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We might even mark it to individuals' credit that in identifying themselves as, say, German or American, they personally feel guilty and personally feel an obligation to make amends in some way for the wrongs
that those speaking or acting for Germany or America have done.
III.

COLIECTIVE GUILT AND THE MITIGATION OF GUILT

It is in the section of the Storrs Lectures titled, "The Distribution of
Guilt: An Argument for Mitigation," 28 that Professor Fletcher offers
his most provocative thesis. If his views were adopted, they would
have an important practical implication: the appropriateness of introducing evidence at trials that might lead to a judgment of lesser guilt
because of the presence of a mitigating factor. Introducing his discussion he writes, "The great challenge in the area is to develop a humanistic approach to collective guilt that would lead to mitigation of
punishment for those whom liberals would regard as guilty rather
29
than to the sanctioning of those treated as innocent bystanders."
Professor Fletcher continues,
I am very much drawn to the idea that the guilt of the German
nation as a whole should mitigate the guilt of particular criminals
like Eichmann, who is guilty to be sure, but guilty like so many
others of a collective crime ....

[I]n cases of genocide and other

collective offenses, there are in fact two perpetrators-the individual and the nation. Considering the guilt of the nation in the sentencing process would provide a concrete and practical way to
recognize collective guilt in criminal trials. Recognizing the mitigating effect of the nation's guilt would mitigate the responsibility of
the offender, though perhaps in many cases this30 guilt would remain
sufficiently grave to justify severe punishment.
What arguments surface in the course of the Storrs Lectures in support of this view? There are, as I read the Lectures, four possibilities,
three of which can, I believe, be quickly dismissed, but one deserves
particular attention because he seems clearly to subscribe to it. The
first possible argument is suggested by some of Professor Fletcher's
language that may lead one to think that he believes mitigation may
be justifiable simply because guilt is distributed among, say, the group
as a whole and individual members of the group. 31 On this view what
we may label "shared guilt" justifies some mitigation. The second ar28

Id. at 1537.

29

Id.

30
31

Id. at 1539.
Id. at 1537.
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gument is that "guiltless sincerity" warrants mitigation. 32 The third
argument is that a collective that is guilty forfeits the right to exact
from one of its members who has done wrong the full measure of
punishment. 33 And the final argument, the one to which I believe
Professor Fletcher subscribes and which is developed in the greatest
detail, is that mitigation is in order when a group's collective guilt
prevents members of the group from exercising their second-order
moral capacity for revision of their moral beliefs.3

4

I want to consider

each of the first three arguments in turn, indicating what language in
the Lectures might lead a reader astray into thinking Professor Fletcher
subscribes to it and then proceed to a more extensive discussion of
the argument he appears principally to rely upon.
A.

The Argument from Shared Guilt

Professor Fletcher writes,
If the dominant systems of beliefs encourage actions like Kristallnacht, lynchings, gay bashings, or domestic violence, those who
succumb to violence are certainly to blame, but one has to wonder
whether they alone are to blame and whether they must bear the
guilt alone.
I want to suggest that those who generate a climate of moral
degeneracy bear some of the guilt for the criminal actions that are
thereby endorsed.

35

Because Professor Fletcher on a number of occasions writes of a
wrongdoer not bearing all of the guilt involved in some wrongdoing,
for example, the German nation for him bears some guilt and Eichmann bears some, for him Milogevi6 bears some but the Serbs do as
well, one might infer that he adopts the view that because there are
several responsible guilty wrongdoers whose conduct accounts for
wrongdoing that this, by itself, reduces the guilt of each of the wrongdoers. This is not, I believe, the position to which he would wish to
subscribe, for his argument for mitigation ultimately rests upon a relationship of a certain kind holding between the several guilty wrongdoers. This is surely the view he must take, for, from the acknowledged
fact that several are responsible for some wrong, and that fact alone, it
seems apparent that no inference can be drawn that the guilt of each
wrongdoer is thereby lessened.
32 Id. at 1550.
33 Id. at 1512.
34 Id. at 1553.
35 Id. at 1541-42.
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The Argument from "Guiltless Sincerity"

Another possible basis suggested, and I believe ultimately rejected by Professor Fletcher for mitigation, derives from wrongdoers'
sincere belief that they are acting rightly. Because of the amount of
attention given to the topic of "guiltless sincerity" in the Lectures, we
may think that it serves for Professor Fletcher as a reason for some
mitigation. He writes, "We should have more doubts than we do
about whether ideological offenders are really guilty and whether the
sanctions they suffer are really punishment rather than measures im36
posed for the sake of social protection."
The reasons, I believe, that Professor Fletcher urges some doubt
on this matter-though he appears to regard the doctrine of "guiltless
sinceity" as a "perversion"3 7 of the Romantic veneration for sincerity-are that, first, he thinks that some moral dogmatism might be
implicated in preferring our values to those of the offender and, second, that punishing them appears to serve the aims of social protection rather than aims of punishment that he sees as more morally
grounded. So, Professor Fletcher writes, "They are guilty for failing to
grasp and to act in conformity with moral truth. This might be right,
but I cannot escape the feeling that this attribution of guilt for ignorance of universal truths carries the ring of moral dogmatism." 38 Even
Hitler, he suggests, might have believed that it was wrong to kill innocent people and been motivated by an erroneous belief that those he

killed posed a threat to the German nation.3 9 His error might have
been "factual" and not an error with regard to a general moral
40
principle.
Fletcher's ultimate conclusion on this issue makes clear, however,
that sincerity of moral conviction is not, by itself, to be viewed as a
mitigating factor:
There is no doubt that those who kill because they believe it is their
religious duty to do so are still murderers and deserve to be punished. But it remains too difficult to explain their punishment to
ourselves when the offenders are impervious to our reasons. We do
not communicate condemnation when they are firmly convinced
that they did the right thing. The challenge is to find the proper
middle way that mitigates punishment on the basis of society's deny36

Id. at 1552.

37 Id. at 1553.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 1554 ("Their ideology was never simply to kill innocents but rather to
eliminate what they perceived, correctly or incorrectly, to be some kind of threat.
Hitler and his followers thought that Jews were strangling the nation.").
40 Id.
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ing offenders their second-order capacity for self-criticism and yet
stops short of excusing offendeis because they are sincere in their
actions.

4

1

This conclusion needs, I believe, some unraveling. First, it appears that sincerity alone, without society also "denying [a person's]
second order capacity for self-criticism," constitutes neither a basis for
complete excuse nor for mitigation. Professor Fletcher might be
troubled that one aim of punishment as he sees it-an effective communication of condemnation to wrongdoers-is not being served
when offenders believe they have acted rightly, and he might perhaps
even believe that we are morally dogmatic in substituting our values
for those of the offender, but he also believes that retributive justice
warrants the full measure of punishment. He also, I imagine, believes
this retributivism is morally grounded. But if this is so, an issue arises
that is not addressed, namely, what has allayed his concerns over the
moral dogmatism presupposed by his retributivist convictions?
Second, when offenders are sincere in believing that they have
acted rightly, and when this fact is combined with "society's" responsibility for denying the second-order capacity to revise one's belief in
the rightness of one's offending action, in Professor Fletcher's view
mitigation is justifiable. Finally, though the topic of "guiltless sincerity" might be thought intrinsically interesting, its connection with the
topic of collective guilt seems entirely accidental, for there are clearly
cases in which no issue of collective guilt is raised but in which an
issue of sincerity might be. For example, we need only imagine the
phenomenon of euthanasia and the number of instances in which the
person responsible for the killing believes his or her action entirely
justifiable.
C.

The Argument from State Forfeiture

At several points in the Lectures, forfeiture is raised to justify mitigation. The collective might have forfeited its right, through its own
guilt, to exact the full measure of the penalty. The "middle way" that
Professor Fletcher has adopted on the issue of "guiltless sincerity"
places an emphasis on society's depriving the wrongdoer of the capacity for self-criticism. 42 But why, we may wonder, does it makes any
difference to one's guilt that the source of the deprivation is society?
If there were another source, say the effect of one's peer group,
should the guilt not be lessened if the capacity is acknowledged to
have been destroyed?
41
42

Id. at 1572.
See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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Focusing on society suggests, then, that society, speaking through
its authoritative organs, is in a lesser position to exact the full measure
of punishment because it is implicated in the guilt of the wrongdoer.
This interpretation of Professor Fletcher's views is somewhat corroborated by another passage:
The theory is not simply an argument of state forfeiture-namely
that the state has misbehaved and therefore cannot punish the
crime fully. The argument is based rather on the distribution of
the offender and
guilt between the offender and society, between
43
the nation in which his life is expressed.
The phrase "not simply" suggests that Professor Fletcher views
forfeiture as a relevant factor when mitigation is at issue. But it seems
evident that, while he might think this true in some cases, it cannot be
true in the cases that most occupy his attention. Specifically, Fletcher
focuses, for the most part, on crimes against humanity and genocide.
Eichmann and Milogevi are two of his principal examples of when
evidence of collective guilt might lead to mitigation, but in neither
case is the entity prosecuting the charged wrongdoer 4 4 itself guilty
with respect to the wrongs in question. It is clear that, despite some
suggestions about forfeiture as a basis for mitigation, Professor
Fletcher cannot rely on this as his principal argument for mitigation.
D.

The Argument from Deprivation of Capacityfor Second-Order
Moral Reflection

Having now put aside some false leads as to the basis for mitigation, we can turn to the argument upon which Professor Fletcher
most clearly relies. He writes,
[W]e must refine our notion of guilt by adding a second-level decision-namely, reflecting upon the intended action and deciding to
go ahead with the criminal deed despite the opposition of others.
The potential criminal in a normally diverse society has an opportunity for self-correction, to revise his criminal impulses in light of
generally prevailing moral norms of the society. Now what happens
in a society in which all the external signals point in favor of the
criminal action? This is the moral condition that generates "the banality of evil," as Hannah Arendt so powerfull' describes the climate
of the Third Reich.

45

43 Fletcher, supra note 2, at 1542-43.
44 In Eichmann's case, the state of Israel acted as prosecutor; for Milogevit, the
prosecuting entity is the international community through the International Criminal
Tribunal for Yugoslavia.
45 Id. at 1541.
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In such a society where "all the external signals point in favor of
criminal action," the state or society "deprives its citizens of a critical
asset in their moral lives, namely the possibility of critical moral selfassessment." 46 The state or society bears guilt because of this and, as
we have seen, this guilt is viewed as possibly justifying the mitigation of
punishment of a wrongdoer such as Eichmann. Professor Fletcher
continues,
The argument is based

...

on the distribution of guilt between of-

fender and society, between the offender and the nation in which
his life is expressed. It should apply in foreign courts as well as in
domestic courts. It should have had a bearing on the sentencing of
Eichmann; it should have influenced our perception of the crime
committed by Timothy McVeigh .... The crime expresses not only

the guilt of the offender but also the collective guilt of those who
deprive offenders of their second-order critical sensibilities.
The argument is not causal in any narrow sense. The claim is not
that the climate of opinion causes the crime, but rather that creating an orthodoxy of hate deprives people of their second-order ca47
pacity to rein in their criminal impulses.
Professor Fletcher, as evident from these quotations, is proposing
what appears to be a new ground for mitigation that bears upon the
degree of guilt if one's capacity to assess the morality of one's actions
has been affected by the guilt attributable to the actor's society. So, in
his view, the concept of collective guilt can operate in a humanizing
fashion-humanizing because it can operate to mitigate the severity
of punishment. We currently have, of course, the defense of legal insanity in which a quite common element in defining the defense is
one's knowledge that what one is doing is wrong. Here, however, we
have a proposal that focuses, not on a psychotic condition, but upon
the general societal environment in which one is acting and which
influences one's capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of one's
conduct.
Professor Fletcher's views with respect to this novel defense raise
two sets of important issues. First, there is a group of questions related to his emphasis upon associative collective guilt as the factor operating upon one's second-order capacities. Associative guilt, it will be
recalled, is a guilt that attaches to the collective and which is not reducible to the sum or aggregate guilt of members of the collective. 48 I
want to ask, first, whether it is required that it be a collective that is
46
47
48

Id. at 1542.
Id. at 1542-43.
See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
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operative upon the Wrongdoer for the defense to arise? Second, why,
if it is indeed a collective operative, that the collective need be guilty?
Third, if it is the collective that is operative and it is indeed guilty,
whether it is the collective guilt that justifies the mitigation. The second group of issues foster questions such as just what effect on one's
second-order capacities is required for mitigation, and what practical
questions arise once we hit upon precisely what the standard for mitigation is to be.
As the factor upon which mitigation turns is an effect on one's
capacity for moral self-evaluation, it is, I believe, apparent that it need
not be a collective of any kind operating upon the wrongdoer. If a
collective can be said to be operative, it need not be guilty, and if in
fact the collective has guilt fairly attributable to it, it is not the guilt of
the collective accounting for the mitigation but the fact that one's
moral capacities have been affected in the requisite manner. So, to
take Eichmann as our example, we have only to imagine that it was a
brain tumor that affected his capacity or that he was totally mesmerized by Hitler. Given Professor Fletcher's broad conception of culpability, should Eichmann's moral capacities have been affected in the
requisite manner, mitigation should still be available to him. And so it
is with guilt as well, for the tumor might have occasioned the loss of
capacity or, if it is a collective that is operating on Eichmann, mitigation might still be justified even if we should believe the collective to
be collectively psychotic and not itself, therefore, guilty. Professor
Fletcher would not, I believe, wish to take exception to the foregoing
points. He wants, rather, to suggest another independent ground for
mitigation, one acknowledging that it is a collective that is operative
and that the collective is, in fact, guilty.
Still, if the collective is guilty, and if it is the collective that affects
Eichmann's moral capacity in the requisite way, what accounts for mitigation is not the guilt of the collective but the effect on capacity. This
becomes apparent when we compare how guilt functions on the capacity rationale and on the forfeiture rationale. On a forfeiture theory it is, indeed, both the collective and its guilt that account for
mitigation. This view has its precursor in "let him who is without sin
cast the first stone! ''49 But with the deprivation of capacity view now

under consideration, it is evident that neither the fact that it is a collective, nor that this collective is guilty, accounts for mitigation.
It follows, I think, that one might accept the plausibility of Professor Fletcher's plea for the desirability of considering mitigation in the
case of Eichmann without at all subscribing either to his view that the
49

John 8:7.
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German nation was a collective to which guilt was properly attributable or, if subscribing to that view, that this fact of guilt was relevant to
the issue of mitigation. Professor Fletcher gives the impression, because of the attention he gives to the issue and the importance he
appears to attach to it, that the German nation's being judged guilty is
relevant to his argument for mitigation. But if he believes this, I think
he is mistaken. The idea, then, of collective guilt does not, at least in
the manner in which Professor Fletcher discusses it, serve as a humanizing factor in criminal punishment.
What precisely must be shown (leaving aside the important issue
of who would bear the burden of proof on the issue) about the effect
on second-order moral capacities for there to be any relevance to
one's guilt? Professor Fletcher is not, on this issue, consistent in his
description of the degree of effect on one's second-order critical capacities. He most frequently writes of offenders being deprived of this
capacity, thereby suggesting that the mitigating defense requires
proof that offenders are unable to use their critical capacities to assess
the wrongfulness of their conduct. Two other formulations indicate
that the deprivation need not be complete, for Professor Fletcher
writes at one point of "partially depriving the offender of the possibility of self-correction ' 50 and, again, of "the [increased] difficulty of
choosing the moral order over the immediate demands of the
5
senses." '
Should we adopt the first, and most commonly invoked, standard
of the effect there must be on one's critical capacities, many questions
naturally present themselves. First, if in fact one has been totally deprived of one's capacity, and if it is true that "all the external signals" 52
point in the direction of one doing the right thing when the person
has done the wrong thing, the issue arises why there is any guilt at all
rather than, as in Professor Fletcher's proposal, lessened guilt. Consider the use of the insanity defense-a defense that might naturally
come to mind because of the relevance commonly attaching to knowledge by the defendant that he or she has done something wrongwhere once it is established that the offender did not know what he or
she was doing was wrong, exculpation follows, not mitigation. Should
one be shown to lack the capacity to know that what one was doing
was wrong, it would seem even more evident that exculpation rather
than mere mitigation was in order.
50
51
52

Fletcher, supra note 2, at 1544.
Id. at 1543.
Id. at 1541.
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Second, whenever it is suggested that lack of capacity be made
relevant within the criminal law, we are confronted with this fundamental issue: what relevant evidence bears on the issue and how reliable is that evidence? As one moves farther away from paradigmatic
cases such as the uncontrolled movements of one's limbs to more
troubling cases of addictions and then, on Professor Fletcher's proposal, to the effects of one's society or culture upon one's critical capacities, progressively more serious doubts arise as to the reliability of the
evidence of absence of capacity. We have only to consider Eichmann
once again-or, for that matter, any case that might arise where the
charge is a crime against humanity or genocide-and ask ourselves
what circumstances within the society of the wrongdoer might warrant
a claim of total deprivation of capacity for moral self-criticism. Whenever one has taken the life of a human being or been complicitous in
doing so-particularly when the lives of many human beings have
been taken-can we imagine that "all the external signals" in a nation
would clearly justify what one is doing? Is it plausible to think that this
was the situation in which Adolf Eichmann found himself? Primo
Levi's words on this issue are worth, I think, bearing in mind:
Never has some form of reaction, a corrective of the total tyranny,
been lacking, not even in the Third Reich or Stalin's Soviet Union:
in both cases public opinion, the magistrature, the foreign press,
the churches, the feeling for justice and humanity that ten or twenty
years of tyranny were not enough to eradicate, have to a greater or
53
lesser extent acted as a brake.

Where we might feel some modest degree of assurance on this
issue of total lack of capacity, say, with a very young child or a clinically
assessed sociopath, the evidence would not be of the person believing
that what he or she was doing was right so much as his or her lack of
capacity to give weight appropriately to moral concepts at all. Once a
person begins justifying some wrongdoing, certainly the process of energetic rationalization in evidence with Eichmann or McVeigh, it is, I
believe, reasonable to assume that the person possesses the capacity to
recognize the evil he or she has perpetrated.5 4
53

PRIMO LEVI, THE DROWNED AND THE SAVED

47

(Raymond Rosenthal trans., Vin-

tage Books 1988) (1986).
54 It is, I think, unfortunate that Professor Fletcher mentions Timothy McVeigh
in the context, perhaps fitting for Eichmann, of a nation's guilt. In saying "all the
external signals," I believe he has in mind that McVeigh was in some way incapacitated through the influence of a more narrowly defined group than the United States
as a whole, but to this extent it becomes even more problematic that McVeigh did not

have available to him the resources to determine that what he was set upon was
wrong. See Fletcher, supra note 2, at 1541.
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Finally, because of these considerations, should the burden of
proof on the issue be placed on the prosecution, it would seem easily
satisfied, because the person, having reached a conclusion on a moral
matter, thereby would seem to demonstrate the possibility of reaching
an alternative conclusion. And, if the burden of persuasion were
placed on the defendant, it would appear quite impossible to establish
the requisite absence of capacity. These considerations strongly suggest that the standard for this proposed mitigating defense should not
be total deprivation of capacity for moral self-evaluation.
If, however, the requisite effect on capacity for moral assessment
is made less stringent, if the standard triggering potential mitigation is
partial deprivation or increased difficulty in bringing one's moral critical capacities to bear on an issue, other serious problems present
themselves. The principal of these is,
I believe, the familiar concern
that there would be an enormously large group of offenders who
would plausibly be in a position to claim that they, for any number of
reasons-poverty, peer pressure, familial influences, etc.-had greater.
difficulty in comporting their conduct to the dictates of morality, or in
reflecting on the morality of their conduct, than would have been the
case without such influence. The law operates, because of these concerns, in an understandably conservative manner, asking for relatively
well-defined categories-whether they be duress, necessity, provocation or mental illness-before opening itself up to the task of adjudicating claims about which reliable evidence is so difficult to come by.
Professor Fletcher's proposal that we focus on "the increased difficulty" of choosing the moral order is a defense whose boundaries go
well beyond collective guilt of a nation and, logically, I believe should
go beyond difficulties related to one's critical capacities. For ability to
do other than what one does is also a culpability condition, and someone might judge what they do to be wrong and yet argue that they
have more difficulty than the "normal" person in forbearing from
such action. Once set upon this path, we risk serious erosion of the
concept of responsibility.
We have here the problem that "influence" does seem clearly to
play a role in our overall assessment of an individual's moral blameworthiness. We are drawn to give influence weight, if not in formulating a defense that might provide for exculpation or, like provocation,
to mitigation, then in the sentencing stage where mitigating and aggravating factors might be taken into account. But once we give into
this understandable pull, I believe we may find ourselves losing moral
traction. In our moral assessment of human beings and the wrongs
they have done, we do approach, it is to be hoped, any final conclusions we may reach appreciative of the uniqueness of each individual's
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life and the innumerable factors, carrying different and largely unknown weight, all of which might be regarded as relevant to fully comprehending and assessing any particular wrong.
We have to know that all that is relevant cannot be before us and
that we cannot know with certitude the full significance of what is
before us. Even a remotely full assessment of any wrong and the
blameworthiness of its perpetrator must be sensitive and marked by
tentativeness and humility. It is understandable that one might be
inclined to leave such assessments to God. To be sure, sometimes the
wrongs are so horrendous that such finely tuned moral assessments
seem quite beside the point. We really do not much care how the
parenting of Hitler, the Versailles Treaty, the prevalence of anti-Semitism in the culture in which he was raised, or the innumerable other
factors that might have had an effect on the man he became were
connected with the crimes Hitler committed. We think him fully responsible, and, if we are religious believers, we are unlikely to believe
that God would find sufficiently extenuating circumstances to lessen
his guilt.
When we turn to the law, we are in a somewhat similar position,
for wrongs have been done and call for final, not tentative, decisions.
While moral considerations obviously enter into our assessments of
legal guilt, we are not disposed to assess the whole of an individual's
life and what may have influenced the wrongful act. When a legal
response is at issue, we understandably focus on more easily graspable
categories, ones relatively more easily ascertainable than many of
those factors we regard as relevant in our overall moral assessment of
an individual in relation to a wrong that has been committed. In assessing the degrees of guilt of those involved in a particular crime, we
shy away from influences, be they one's parents or economic status or
the atmosphere in a society, and focus on such questions as, who came
up with the idea? How significant was one's role in carrying out the
idea? Was the person fearful of the consequences of not acting
wrongfully? Was the person more or less identified with the criminal
project? Certainly, these pose troubling issues, and our own criminal
law of complicity largely ignores them, but I believe their difficulty
pales in comparison with what we should face were we to attempt to
determine the effects upon one's moral capacities as a consequence of
the society in which a wrongdoer lived or the groups of which one was
a member.
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Professor Fletcher's proposal has brought to my mind a surreal
scene that appears in Durrenmatt's novella, Traps5 5 when the defense
attorney, to the great distress of Traps, the man he is defending and
who takes great pride in his ingenious crime, argues:
Taken all in all, we cannot detect more than an unethical taint, a
slight spoilage, such as occurs and must occur in so many average
lives. But for that very reason, on the other hand, he is not capable
of a culpability that is great and pure and proud; he is not capable
of a resolute deed, an unequivocal crime. He is not a criminal, but
a victim of the age, of our Western civilization, which, alas, has
fallen farther and farther away from Faith, from Christianity, from
universals, succumbing more and more to the rule of chaos, so that
the individual no longer may look up to a guiding star, and in place
of order and true morality disorder and immorality reign, the law of
6
the jungle prevails?
Traps gratefully and proudly accepts the verdict "Guilty!" and
seeks the maximum penalty for his beautiful crime.
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